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BELIEVING THAT GOD EXISTS 
BECAUSE THE BIBLE SAYS SO 
John Lamont 
The paper considers Renee Descartes' assertion that believing that God 
exists because the Bible says so, and believing that what the Bible says is 
true because God says it, involves circular reasoning. It argues that there is 
no circularity involved in holding these beliefs, and maintains that the 
appearance of circularity results from an equivocation. It considers a line of 
argument that would defend the rationality of holding these beliefs, but 
does not try to prove its soundness. 
In the dedicatory letter to the dean and faculty of theology at Paris with 
which he prefaces his Meditations, Renee Descartes sarcastically remarks 
that it is inadvisable to tell unbelievers that God exists because the Bible 
says so, and that what the Bible says is true because God says so, 
because this presents the appearance of circular reasoning.] This has 
been thought of, by anyone who happened to think of it, as a telling 
remark. But in fact Descartes' sarcasm is misplaced. There is no circulari-
ty involved in holding that God exists because the Bible says so, and that 
what the Bible says is true because God says so. 
This can be seen by considering a parallel case. Suppose I receive a 
letter from someone who identifies himself as Mr. Jones, the District 
Superintendent of the Water Conservation Board. He tells me that it has 
come to his attention that I have been watering my lawn for six hours 
every day of the week, and he wants me to know that if I do not reduce 
my water consumption I will be fined and my water will be cut off. I am 
a bit surprised at this message, since I have never heard of Mr. Jones or 
the Water Conservation Board before, but I accept that what the letter 
says is true. 
In this case it is clear that I can believe what the letter says without 
being guilty of circular reasoning. But then I will be believing that Mr. 
Jones exists because the letter says it, and I will be believing what the let-
ter says because Mr. Jones says it. Replace the letter by the Bible, and Mr. 
Jones by God, and I will believe that God exists because the Bible says so, 
and that what the Bible says is true because God says SO.2 Since there is 
no circularity in the former case, there is no circularity in the latter. 
One might raise the following question: should we say that I believe 
the letter because Mr. Jones says it? Do I not simply believe the letter? 
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The answer to this question can be seen by considering what I would 
say if someone asked me why I believed that my water was going to be 
cut off, or why T thought there was such a person as Mr. Jones. I would 
answer, "Jones told me these things himself, in the letter he sent me". My 
believing the contents of the letter is my believing what Mr. Jones says, 
because he says it. 
We commonly accept people's identities on the basis of what they tell 
us. This happens whenever someone introduces himself to us, and we 
believe their introduction ("Hello, I am Mr. X, etc"). Accepting that 
someone exists because he tells us so, although less usual, need not be 
less reasonable. There is no circularity in believing statements of the 
form "X exists because X says so". ("Believing that X exists because X 
says so" is of course understood to mean "believing that X exists on the 
grounds of X's saying so", not "believing that X's saying that he exists is 
the cause of his existence.") Consider this example; suppose there is a 
God, and one day an atheist loudly announces his disbelief in God. To 
teach the atheist a lesson, God causes the sun to be extinguished so that 
the stars appear, and causes all the stars in the sky to arrange themselves 
to read "I, God, exist"; at the same time he causes the same words to be 
announced in a loud and thunderous voice. Things return to normal 
after a few moments, but the atheist is persuaded by these happenings, 
and believes that God exists. In these circumstances, the atheist will be 
believing that God exists because God says so, and there will be no cir-
cularity involved in his belief. 
It is helpful to consider how my beliefs would be connected in these 
cases, in order to see that they are not circular. In the case of the letter, I 
start off by reading the letter, and this leads me to form the following 
belief; 
B1. The letter says that Mr. Jones exists, is its author, intends to cut 
off my water, etc. (let "etc." stand for all the rest of the content of 
the letter). 
I trust the letter, and thus believe 
B2. Mr. Jones exists, etc. and is the author of the letter. 
When I reflect on my reason for believing that Jones exists, etc., I form 
the belief that 
B3. Mr. Jones exists, etc., because the letter says so. 
When I ask myself why T accept the contents of the letter, T conclude 
B4. What the letter says is true because Mr. Jones says it. 
The appearance of circularity in B3 and B4 arises from an equivocation 
on "says". In B3, "the letter says" refers to the act of assertion of the letter. 
B3 states that I accept the content of the letter ("Mr. Jones exists, etc.") 
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because the letter asserts it. In B4, "what the letter says" refers to the con-
tent of the letter's assertion. Let P represent the content of the letter. We 
can rewrite B3 and B4 as follows; 
B3'. P is true because the letter asserts it. 
B4'. P is true because Mr. Jones asserts it. 
B3' and B4', it can be seen, are not circular, but equivalent, because the 
letter's asserting P is Mr. Jones's asserting P. P contains the statement 
that Mr. Jones exists, so my holding B4' will imply that I believe that 
(Mr. Jones exists because Mr. Jones says so), but, as we have seen, such a 
statement is not circular. Replace Mr. Jones by God, and the letter by the 
Bible, and the same considerations apply. 
The absence of circularity lends support to a point recently made by 
professors Anscombe and Geach: 
... Plantinga and Wolterstorff ... are both explicitly opposed to foun-
dationalism. Why, they would ask, should not beliefs in the exis-
tence of God and other articles of the Christian creed be treated as 
themselves "properly basic"? A good question. It is not on the face 
of it absurd to come to belief in God as part of a package deal, as 
part of a revelation.' 
Plantinga's views can provide reasons why we should treat belief in God 
as properly basic, when it is accepted as part of a revelation. Belief in the 
Bible, belief in a purported revelation, is an instance of belief in testimo-
ny. Plantinga, following Thomas Reid, Geach and Richard Swinburne, 
asserts that " ... the warrant furnished by testimony isn't and couldn't be 
furnished by induction, analogy, and abduction. Testimony is an inde-
pendent source of warrant for me;" - and presumably for everyone else as 
well- "testimonial evidence is a basic sort of evidence for me."4 One could 
thus argue: testimony is a basic sort of evidence, that provides warrant 
on its own; believing in the Bible is believing in testimony; therefore 
believing that God exists because the Bible says so is warranted. 
I do not mean to defend this argument here. Such a defence would 
require addressing the questions of proper basicality, of the nature of testi-
mony, of credulity, of evidence against the existence of God. I merely seek to 
indicate lines of inquiry that can be pursued, when we realize that there is no 
circularity involved in believing that God exists because the Bible says so. 
NOTES 
The Queen's College 
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1. "Et quoi qu'il soit absolument vrai, qu'il}aut croire qu'il y a un Dieu, 
parce qu'il est ainsi enseigne dans les Saintes Ecritures, et d'autre part qu'il 
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faut croire les Saintes Ecritures, parce qu'elles viennent de Dieu; et ceci parce 
que, la foi etant un don de Dieu, celui-la meme qui donne la grace pour faire 
croire les autres choses, la peut aussi donner pour nous faire croire qu'il 
existe: on ne saurait neanmoins proposer cela aux infideles, qui pourraient 
s'imaginer que 1'0n commettrait en ceci la faute que les logiciens nomment 
un Cercle." Renee Descartes, Oeuvres Philosophiqucs, Tome II (1638-1642), 
Ferdinand Alquie ed. (Paris: Editions Garnier Freres, 1967), p.364. This pas-
sage is taken from the translation of the Meditations by the duc de Luynes, 
that Descartes read and approved. Some might deny that Descartes is being 
sarcastic here, and assert that he is only trying to anticipate a possible objec-
tion to his procedure in proving the existence of God; he is not really insinu-
ating that there is circularity in such reasoning. I doubt if this is true, but the 
question of circularity is worth investigating whether or not Descartes 
believed it to exist. 
2. It is worth pointing out that Christians do not all mean the same 
thing when they talk about "the Bible". Fr. James Weisheipl, in his introduc-
tion to Aquinas's Commentary on the Gospel of John (Albany, N.Y.: Magi 
Books, 1980), remarks that " ... Luther and Thomas (or any other medieval 
theologian) meant two different things by the word Bible, or Sacred 
Scriptllres. For Luther and the Reformers the Bible was thought of as a fin-
ished, edited, and (by then) printed collection, while Thomas and the 
medieval theologians meant the Sacred Word together with the gloss of the 
Fathers, liturgy, and the living Church." The argument of this paper can be 
applied to either conception of the Bible. 
3. Profs. P. Geach and E. Anscombe, review of Philosophers Who Believe: 
The Spiritual Journeys of 11 Leading Thinkers, in Priests & People, October 1994, 
p.404. 
4. Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), pp. 79-80. 
